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Abstract
In the context of products employing speech recognition, where the speech signal is sent
from the device to centralized servers that process data, or simply products that involve
data storage on servers, privacy for audio data is an important issue, just as it is for other
types of data. Ignoring privacy has consequences for both, speakers (information leaks) and
server administrators (legal issues). In this paper, we propose a speaker de-identification
solution based on sound processing, altering voice characteristics, along with an API. Our
solution consisting of pitch shift and noise mix (the latter is an optional augmentation
method) has a great speaker de-identification performance, without an important loss in
terms of word intelligibility. It is worth mentioning that sometimes the recordings may not
be easy to understand in the initial (i.e., not de-identified) form, due to the speaker’s
pronunciation, talking speed, and other related factors.
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1.

Introduction

Voice privacy, also referred to as speaker anonymization [2] or de-identification [9], is an
essential security aspect in different communication contexts. Privacy in general (i.e., for
all data types) is the reason for adopting the recent law, General Data Protection Regulation
(EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) [12]. In order to preserve the speaker’s privacy, some solutions
have been proposed. Beyond cryptography-based solutions [14], there are approaches
consisting in the removal of personally identifiable information within a speech signal [6,
7], [21].
The main hypothesis of this paper is that the speaker de-identification can be
performed more securely by sound processing.
We propose a speaker de-identification solution based on sound processing, which
modifies the voice in order to remove as much as possible from the particularities that lead
to speaker recognition, with the words remaining intelligible. We give some use-cases,
sorted in ascending order by the severity of disclosing someone’s identity: low - product
guide, faculty admission committee guidance, medium - teacher evaluation, vocal
command application, support group meeting, and high - business meeting, trial. The rest
of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes existing speaker deidentification approaches, with applicability in security, and presents available tools with
voice processing features, used for entertainment. Section 3 refers to the solution we
propose, in terms of de-identification techniques and system architecture. Section 4
presents the evaluation of our solution, involving human participants, before drawing some
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conclusions in the last section.

2.

Related Works

In this section, we introduce existing approaches in the security context of speaker deidentification and also products used for entertainment. Essentially, the speaker-dependent
variability is based on parameters related to the speaker (e.g., age [4], gender [8],
pathologies [1]) and the environment (e.g., noise, channels).
In [14], there are proposed two privacy-preserving frameworks: rendering secure
algorithms by employing techniques such as homomorphic encryption, secure multi-party
computation, and oblivious transfer, and modifying voice pattern classification tasks into
string comparison operations. [6] presents the modification of a source speaker’s voice into
a target speaker’s voice by using Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) mappings, and [7]
describes an approach consisting of diphone recognition, done mainly by Hidden Markov
Models (HMMs) and GMMs, and speech synthesis, HMM-based or diphone-based; The
adversarial representation learning technique in [21] has the goal of learning
representations that perform well in speech recognition but hide the speaker’s identity and
it mainly consists of an encoder, a decoder (this component is for speech recognition), and
an adversarial branch (this component is for speaker identification).
We believe that the security tools are less known to the general public, but very useful
for enterprises or governmental institutions. The products used for entertainment seem to
be more available, Table 1 describes some of them. They usually provide voice
modification features (custom or preset) and sound effects. The fact that these products
seem to be easier to obtain emphasizes that our solution is needed.
Table 1. Existing tools, but used for entertainment
Product
Voxal Voice Changer [23]
Skype Voice Changer [19]
PyVoiceChanger [16]

Platforms
Windows & Mac OS X
Windows
Linux

Usage
general
Skype
general

Additional Features
text-to-speech
sound player, text-to-speech, recorder
-

We can draw the conclusion from the relevant work on this topic that speaker deidentification is a task with multiple approaches, but very difficult.

3.

Proposed Solution

In this section, we present our solution, which does not consist just of speaker deidentification techniques, as we also developed a system with multiple components,
including an API.
3.1.

Technologies

We used Python 3.8.8 [15] and several modules. The most important modules were
LibROSA 0.8.0 [10] (sound processing), NumPy 1.20.1 [5] (numerical computing and ndimensional arrays), Flask 1.1.2 [3] (API building), and Requests 2.25.1 [17] (API requests
sending). The audio file codecs our product supports depend on the codecs managed by an
important dependency of LibROSA, called SoundFile [20] (e.g., usual variants of WAV,
FLAC). Also, it is worth mentioning that we decided to convert the recordings to mono
(one channel).
3.2.

System Components

The system we developed has four components:
● Sound processing component - audio input/output functionality and speaker deidentification techniques, pitch shift and noise mix;
● Small framework for performing multiple de-identification runs - component
that ensures experimental repeatability and reproducibility, by separating the input
and output data, in a rigorous but easy to understand way;
● Small framework for evaluation - data management and metrics computation;
● API - the speaker de-identification product the users interact with.
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The main components are the sound processing component and the API. We chose to
provide services through an API and not through a specialized application, in order to cover
multiple, potential use-cases. There are two security degrees, normal and advanced, that
differ in terms of the used techniques/parameter values. The users do not have to register
and their recordings are not kept on the server. The API provides both de-identification
and recording reconstruction, the latter feature being done by inverting the deidentification operations. Due to factors such as the conversion to mono, a file obtained by
reconstruction is not 100% the original, but the differences are not relevant. The system
performs the following steps:
De-identification
1. Get the security degree from the route the request was sent to ( <deidentification_route>/("normal"|"advanced")) and the recording;
2. Pick technique(s) and parameter values, according to the security degree;
3. Perform the necessary processing;
4. Generate an API key;
5. Save the operations needed for the reconstruction of the original recording,
represented by the inverses of all modification operations in inverse order, in a place
that is identified by the API key; A hash is stored, not the key itself;
6. Send to the user the de-identified recording and the API key.
Reconstruction
1. Get the recording and the API key, sent by the user at the specific route
(<reconstruction_route>);
2. Load the necessary operations to perform the reconstruction according to the key;
3. Perform the necessary processing;
4. Send to the user the reconstructed recording.
We also provided a <help_route>. Figure 1 presents the most important components.

Fig. 1. Main components (Sound processing and API) architecture

3.3.

Speaker De-identification Techniques Description

In the context of pitch shift, we explain the first two terms [24], semitone and octave (from
music, but important in our context). The semitone is the interval between two adjacent
pitches, while the octave (12 semitones) is the interval between two pitches that have a 1:2
(or 2:1) frequency ratio. The usual voice pitch range [13] is 125 Hz (the average of adult
male speech) - 500 Hz (the minimum of baby cries). The LibROSA package provides the
pitch_shift function, that time-stretches, resamples, and crops to the initial dimension
(basically, NumPy array size) an input signal. Two of its parameters are n_steps (how much
to modify the voice) and bins_per_octave (how is an octave divided). A positive n_steps
value makes the pitch higher, while a negative value makes it lower. The value of the
parameter bins_per_octave is by default 12, but we used 24, in order to control the steps
better (they can be considered quarter-tones). To get the inverse operation we multiply by
-1 the n_steps value.
Regarding noise mix, we consider it an augmentation method for pitch shift, which is
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the main speaker de-identification technique. Thus, we only use noise mix as an optional
addition to pitch shift, not independently. An important aspect is the signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) [18], a metric computed by dividing the level of a signal by the level of noise and
usually expressed in decibels (dB). There are two main types of noise [11]: Additive White
Gaussian Noise (AWGN) and real world noise. We only used the former, which consists
in noise generated using a Gaussian distribution with the mean value of 0. AWGN is mixed
with a signal by addition and to get the inverse operation we multiply by -1 all noise
samples.

4.

Evaluation

In this section, we describe how we measured the quality of our solution. Our approach
implies human evaluators and it can be used to test similar systems, with few
customizations. We simulated the teacher evaluation process that is performed at the end
of each term at our faculty. Basically, the students provide feedback on the teachers, taking
into consideration aspects such as the ability to explain the discussed topics well, the
objectivity in grading, and the organizational skills. We chose to simulate this scenario
because of its academically character.
4.1.

Overview

We approached the speaker identification and word intelligibility problems. We used
accuracy for speaker identification and word error rate (WER) [22] for speech recognition.
Both metrics need to be low. WER is obtained by dividing the number of all editing
operations (i.e., substitutions, insertions, and deletions), necessary in order to get the
hypothesis (assumed) text from the reference (real) text, by the number of words in the
reference text.
4.2.

Participants

The test participants were four teachers and six students. The students were 23-25 years
old. They are colleagues and the teachers work/worked with them, so the listeners
recognize the speakers in normal conditions. We also consider two fictional faculty
teachers. We chose to add fictional persons in order to make the students more comfortable
giving reviews.
4.3.

Stages

There were three stages: (1) tasks (preceded by an introduction), (2) a post-test
Questionnaire for User Interaction Satisfaction (QUIS), with integer scores between 1
(“never”) and 9 (“always”), and (3) post-test open-ended questions, asking the participants
what they (dis)liked, and what recommendations did they have. In the following, we
present the tasks. The students recorded themselves giving a grade (mandatory item,
required a 0-4 integer value), positive and negative comments, and suggestions for the
fictional teachers (distinct recordings), and provided the transcriptions of what they said.
All the participants then tried to recognize the speakers and to understand the words in deidentified versions of the recordings. The students did not perform the last tasks for their
own recordings and also all the participants were imposed a maximum of eight plays per
recording.
4.4.

Data

The recordings were WAV files, 21-35 seconds long (only the former was a requirement).
We applied pitch shift with the bins_per_octave value of 24, without noise mix, for the
recordings we gave back to the participants. We noticed that the word intelligibility
decreases quicker for the low-pitched voices, so we used less steps (in absolute values) for
them. On average, for the high-pitched voices n_steps is 24 and for the low-pitched ones
it is -15.
4.5.

Results

Separately provided for teachers/students, the accuracy of the speaker identity assumptions
and the WER on average for high/low-pitched voices can be seen in Table 2.
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Table 2. Teachers/students average accuracy and WER for high/low-pitched voices
High Pitch Category
Teachers
Metrics
Accuracy (%)
16.67
WER (%)
33.33
Low Pitch Category
Teachers
Metrics
Accuracy (%)
WER (%)

66.67
47.5

Students
83.33
16.67
Students
83.33
16.67

Separately provided for teachers/students, the QUIS scores (1-9 scale) on average can
be seen in Table 3.
Table 3. Teachers/students QUIS average scores
Opinions
The speakers’ identities cannot easily be detected.
Words can be understood without too much effort.
The recordings, although they may sound weird, are tolerable.
A task done in an audio-based manner, provided with a de-identification
service, can replace the same task performed in a text-based manner.
Generally speaking, this service works well.

Teachers
7
5
7
7
7

Students
8.33
7
7
6.67
7.33

From the participants’ answers to the open-ended questions, we mainly found out that
they considered that de-identification is achieved and they had the following ideas: make
all recordings have approximately the same volume, add real-time processing, and add
sentiment analysis in order to use high pitch for a positive review and low pitch for a
negative one.
We provide the following experimental conclusions, which depend on the goal of
obtaining a balance between the speaker’s identity protection and the word intelligibility:
● The speakers/listeners were not English natives, therefore for the original
recordings we could have had approximately a 10% WER;
● According to Table 2, the high-pitched voices are better for speaker deidentification and easier to understand than the low-pitched ones;
● The pitch should be modified between half an octave and an octave, up or down;
● The identity of the speaker is difficult to determine, usually, the participants had to
consider speech particularities (e.g., talking speed, English speaking skills),
analyze the words, make correlations, use the process of elimination, or guess;
● From our experience, as we did not test noise mix with the participants, the best
values for the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) were approximately in the [-10dB, 20dB]
interval. These values depended on the recordings, so it is difficult to generalize.

5.

Conclusions

This paper highlights that providing privacy in audio recordings is just as important as in
textual or other types of data. There are multiple use-cases, therefore we had a general
approach to the problem, leaving to other programmers the task of building customized
products, using our API. Our solution using pitch shift (optionally augmented with noise
mix) performs speaker de-identification very well, without altering too much the word
intelligibility. In many cases of recordings that cannot be understood properly, the problem
is mainly due to issues already present in the original files (e.g., speaker’s pronunciation).
The evaluation section presented our findings about the implemented speaker deidentification solution, supporting the previous claims. The test was made possible by
human evaluators.
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